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ABSTRACT
The Counterdrug Joint Task Force (JTF) represents an organizational environment that demonstrates
requirements needed by most joint task forces. The nature of a JTF is that of a temporary
organization established from many organizations to accomplish a specific task. Once this task is
completed the different organizational elements return to their previous command structure. By
designing the JTF using a systems engineering approach of top down decomposition, a format for the
baseline requirements can be established. This decomposition format can be applied to generate other
JTFs or re-applied to existing JTFs to verify systems requirements compliance. This thesis conducts
a breadth-first examination of the Counterdrug JTF detection and monitoring process. Systems
engineering software using IDEFO facilitates this design and is demonstrated in this thesis. A detailed
analysis is then conducted for the data fusion and decision support sub-functions of the detection and
monitoring process. The development of an alternative candidate architecture provides a different
perspective to accomplishing top level system requirements. Designing a functional architecture using
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE ENVIRONMENT
A. BACKGROUND
Many existing Department of Defense organizations become fully operational yet
fall short of meeting mission requirements because their missions were not designed from
a systems perspective. Their ability to accomplish their mission is severely hampered
by constant distractions generated from the necessity to refit or reorganize their
operational systems. This shortfall is due to unplanned circumstances or incompatible
systems that cannot interface with their environment. Systems Engineering design tools
greatly enhance the performance of the system. Even for systems already functioning,
a decomposition of the original requirements can enhance the performance, streamline
functionality, and improve the quality of the system's output. This technique is called
process re-engineering.
Disaggragating the mission of the Counterdrug Joint Task Force (JTF) (as an
example of a multi-agency task force), demonstrates the complexities involved in
creating and running what will be in the future a more common command and control
environment. This system represents common military applications demonstrated by
focusing on the detection and monitoring processes of the Counterdrug JTF. The fusing
multiple source data into a useable product is a key military application exhibited by the
Counterdrug JTF.
The amount of data flowing into a command center expands beyond the decision
makers capability to decipher it and fuse it into working, timely information. Data
fusion is defined in a military context as a process that is performed on multi-source
data at several levels. Each level dealing with the detection, association, correlation,
estimation and completely and timely assessments of the situation and threat .
Understanding the detail of the systems necessary to fuse data from many sources and
from many levels into a viable product reduces inefficiency caused by retroactive system
re-building within any military organization. [Ref. 1: p. 1]
B. SCOPE
This thesis will focus on the design of a candidate architecture based on the
requirements established for the Department of Defense by the Defense Appropriations
Act of 1989. The interpretation of those requirements by the armed service further
directs the design problem[Ref. 2: p. 6]. This thesis focuses on the functions integral in
making decisions for intelligence collection and interdiction operations within a
Counterdrug JTF. This narrow scope generates the basic requirements that initiate the
design for a candidate functional architecture for detection and monitoring data fusion
operations. This thesis provides an alternative architecture based on the original
Department of Defense (DOD) guidelines to demonstrate compliance to requirements
with a different approach. This thesis does not establish requirements for the physical
systems involved in the complicated process of detection and monitoring.
C. METHODOLOGY
This thesis demonstrates a technique for designing a multi-agency JTF that has a
detection and monitoring function. The systems engineering approach to designing a
candidate functional architecture focuses on the ability to delineate the exact, detailed
requirements necessary to accomplish the mission of the organization. These
requirements are described as top-level-system-requirements (TLSRs) [Ref. 3:p. 28A].
The mission must be clearly defined and inflexible if a workable design is to be
constructed. The guidelines established for the DOD by the national command authority
provide the baseline requirements for the development of the TLSRs. These guidelines
establish the responsibilities of the DOD and their relationship with federal Counterdrug
agencies. This thesis will use a design technique variation of Structured Analysis and
Design Technique (SADT) called IDEFO, which is explained in Appendix A. This
approach will decompose the stated requirements and develop a candidate architecture
for the data fusion function of the detection and monitoring process.
D. SYNOPSIS
This thesis begins with a review of the environment and its impact on the system
in focus in Chapter I. This chapter has introduced the environment that the system-in-
focus operates within and provides a perspective to conduct the functional design for a
candidate architecture. Chapter II will develop the first level of decomposition, level
zero. This level examines the system-in-focus from a macro level and demonstrates its
interactions with the environment. The data association and correlation of these multiple
agency inputs are processes that are decomposed in this thesis. The systems
interoperability and the dissemination of the intelligence products developed in the
decision cycle of the Counterdrug JTFs is reviewed with a breadth first examination to
determine areas of decomposition. Chapter n initiates the decomposition of the system-
in-focus and examines the interaction of the controls and inputs which are the crucial
catalysts from the environment.
Chapter in establishes mission-scenario combinations that generate requirements
for the sub-functions identified at this level of decomposition. These sub-functions in
turn generate detailed sub-functions that further work to define the system-in-focus. By
focusing on one sub-function at each layer of decomposition, the specific requirements
of detection and monitoring established at level zero are traced to the lowest level
disaggregation. At this simplified level the engineer starts to build systems that will
accomplish each sub-functional requirement. Because of this simplified level, the
interaction of the subfunctions and their inter-relationships are programmed into the
system design, rather than having to be retroactively installed at a later time.
Chapter IV describes the level of decomposition that interacts with the human
decision making cycle. The next level of decomposition will describe in greater detail
the decision process involved in physically incorporating the specific track into current
operations by creating a track model. This model will generate a decision cycle in the
current operations.
Chapter V describes the data fusion function and the criteria for completion of a
design. When it is apparent that any further decomposition will require a discussion of
how the process physically accomplishes its functions, then a different level of
abstraction is needed. The discussion of the use of specific types of expert systems or
decision support systems to facilitate sub-functional operations and their development
would breach the current abstraction level. This level of decomposition is not sufficient
to design a complete functional architecture for the Counterdrug JTF. Its purpose has
been to establish the framework for the continuing examination of each level of the
functional architecture and initiate the examination of possible alternative functional
architectures that would accomplish the TLSRs. These alternative architectures may
depart from the candidate architecture at any level of decomposition. This departure
must still accomplish the sub-functional requirements of any parent functions associated
with the design. Chapter VI proposes an alternative architecture based on an examination
of the original guidelines established to define the detection and monitoring mission for
DOD. Chapter VII is the conclusion of the thesis with the recommendation for the use
of the system design process to create a template for establishing joint task forces.
E. THE SYSTEM-IN-FOCUS
The system-in-focus is the entity that must be delineated from the environment.
In this case the system is distinguished from its environment by the chain of command
it operates within, the controls it must function with, the resources it uses to accomplish
its TLSR compliant functions, and the output it produces[Ref. 4:p. 1A]. The
Counterdrug JTF is the system that will be decomposed to identify the TLSR compliant
functions necessary to conduct detection and monitoring operations. There are currently
three counterdrug JTFs operating under the command of their respective regional
specified command under the Joint Chiefs of Staff within DOD. Although no one specific
JTF was modeled in this thesis, JTF 4 and JTF 5 represent the system with the
decomposable detection and monitoring requirements. DOD must coordinate all
counterdrug policy issues with the Office of National Drug Control Policy
(ONDCP)[Ref. 5:p. 3-17]. Figure 1 illustrates the federal counterdrug community.
F. THE ENVIRONMENT OF THE SYSTEM-IN-FOCUS
1. Background: DODs Role In Counterdrug Operations
a. Defense Appropriations Act of 1989
The Defense Appropriations Act of 1989 defined the lead agencies
responsibilities in the federal counterdrug community. DOD became the lead agency
responsible for the detection and monitoring of drug trafficking craft attempting to enter
the United States by air, sea, or ground. Coordinating issues concerning the command,
control, communications and intelligence (C3I) assets was also delineated as the
responsibility of DOD. [Ref. 6: p. 65]
b. Creation of the JTFs
The Joint Chiefs of Staff directed regional specified commands to
establish JCS direction of the formation of regional JTFs. These JTFs would promote
regional coordination with all agencies involved in interdiction operations by providing
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Figure 1: Federal Counterdrug Community
The JTF would also provide coordination for the exploitation of DOD C3I assets to
regional federal and local counterdrug agencies[Ref. 7]. Figure 3 at the end of the
chapter illustrates a typical JTF regional counterdrug agency environment.
c. The Posse Comitatus Act
A limiting parameter critical in the examination of the environment
within which the counterdrug JTFs operate is the exclusion of any DOD personnel from
conducting any law enforcement activities within the United States. Title 10 and the
Posse Comitatus Act describe what actions are prohibited to the military. 1
2. Factors Affecting Sensor Input
a. The Enemy
Drug trafficking is a multi-billion dollar a year profit making industry.
This industry has its own infrastructure including sophisticated production, transportation
and distribution systems. The elements creating the sensor input to the JTF is the
transportation techniques used by drug traffickers to ensure a supply for distribution. [Ref.
8:p. 112]
b. Smuggling Methods and Routes
Cocaine, heroin and marijuana represent the three major types of illegal
drugs that require interdiction operations. Most heroin originates in Asia and crosses the
Pacific Ocean by ship. Often these large ships meet with smaller, faster craft offshore
1 There are specific instances where under a state of emergency federal troops can conduct
these activities, see Title 10 of the U.S. Code and the Posse Comitatus.
to diversify the actual port of entries for the drugs. Cocaine travels by both ship and
plane from South America. 80% of all Cocaine entering the United States is grown in
Peru and manufactured into the final product in Columbia. A current trend is a shift in
manufacturing sites to the Upper Amazon in Brazil, and in Ecuador. Marijuana comes
by ship, plane and ground vehicle from Mexico and South America. The most used
routes for transportation into the United States are shown in Figure 2.[Ref. 9:p. 36]
Figure 2: Major Drug Smuggling Routes
c. JTF Sensor Support Agencies
The data fusion that occurs within a Counterdrug JTF refers to both the
automated systems processes and the human decision making process. The correlation
of data from many different agencies into a useable intelligence product incorporates both




NORAD: Target detection, identification and tracking into the Air
Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) transmitted via the Defense Data Network (DDN)
and the Joint Visual Integrated Display System (JVIDS).
(2) USN Ships and Aircraft: Target detection, identification and
tracking in assigned areas of responsibilities transmitted via secure satellite
communications, FM radio transmission and JVIDS.
(3) United States Coast Guard Ships and Aircraft: Target detection,
identification and tracking in assigned areas of responsibilities transmitted via secure
satellite communications, FM radio transmission and JVIDS.
(4) United States Air Force Aircraft: Target detection, identification
and tracking in assigned areas of responsibilities transmitted via secure FM radio
transmission and secure digital data networks.
(5) The Drug Enforcement Administration: Intelligence reports based
on the collection of information from informants, foreign country law enforcement,
10










































Figure 3: Regional JTF Environment
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(6) Defense Intelligence Agency: Intelligence reports based on the
collection of information from informants, foreign country intelligence services, attaches
in U.S. embassies abroad, and other HUMINT sources.
(7) Other National Technical Means: Sophisticated systems on from
spacecraft, high flying aircraft, and other national sources provide imagery intelligence
(IMINT) to the JTFs. Other national agencies provide electronic (ELJNT) and
communication (COMINT) intelligence reports transmitted via Special Compartmented
Information (SCI) networks to the JTFs.[Ref. 10: pp. 66-73]
G. SUMMARY
This chapter introduced the environment that the system-in focus operates within
and provides a perspective to conduct the functional design for a candidate architecture.
Chapter n will develop the first level of decomposition, level zero. This level examines
the system-in-focus from a macro level and demonstrates its interactions with the
environment. The data association and correlation of these multiple agency inputs are
processes that are decomposed in this thesis. The systems interoperability and the
dissemination of the intelligence products developed in the decision cycle of the




This chapter will define level zero of the Counterdrug JTF. The IDEFO
methodology will describe the system and display the structural aspects of the JTF
architecture. This will allow for a visual representation of the decomposition of the
elements that form the requirements for the Counterdrug JTF. Appendix A provides a
detailed explanation of this top down approach that illustrates systems engineering
decomposition.
The system engineering approach begins with the capturing of the system-in-focus
by defining its boundary with the environment. To study one system, it is important to
be able to distinguish what qualities can be attributed directly to it, rather than from some
external factor. Systems engineering directs attention on the system-in-focus by
bounding it with specific criteria. Whatever is within the boundary is the system,
everything else is in the environment. Developing this environmental interface will
produce scenarios that can be paired with specific functions. After the pairing of the
scenario-requirements sets, the functions can then be reduced to a level where they
appear unique in activity and have one or only a few relationships with other functions.
Figure 4 shows a path through the levels of decomposition, beginning with the system-in-
focus and the primary top level requirements. These requirements generate the





































Figure 4: Decompositional Path
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The scope of this thesis is focused on the intelligence analysis and operational data
fusion requirements generated by the Counterdrug JTF's detection and monitoring
mission. In order to maintain this scope only those elements depicted in bold in Figure
4 will be decomposed. The other elements will be described in less detail in order to
relate their processes to the decomposed function. Such an approach facilitates
information hiding2 and simplifies the building of the architecture by insuring
inter-operability before system construction. [Ref. 3: p. ii].
A. LEVEL ZERO
Systems engineering describes the first layer of architectural decomposition as the
point where the system-in-focus reacts with its environment at the most general level
[Ref. 3:p. 5]. This level is defined by four factors; controls, inputs, resources and
outputs. Figure 5 illustrates the interaction of the system-in-focus with the environment.
Through inputs and outputs the system receives variables. The controls and resources
(mechanisms) structure the interaction of the system-in-focus with the environment. An
activity report at the end of the chapter describes the separate factors as they interact with
the system-in-focus. These reports are generated by the IDEFO software and assist in
tracking the flow of data through the function. Each IDEFO design associates an activity
report in subsequent levels of decomposition to its respective diagram. Following the
2 Information hiding is the principle that modules and functions should be designed so that
the variables within the module are inaccessible or hidden from other modules. Unless there is
specific need for modules to share the variables, the modules are independent of each other. This
promotes design simplicity and minimizes complex interactions and coordination of effort. [Ref.
3: p. 6 ]
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activity reports from one level to the next will help the reader see the coupling of
functions from level to level.
1. Controls
Controls are the driving elements that define and restrict the actions of the
system-in-focus. These controls represent a command structure as well as the mission
of the system-in-focus. This mission generates a set of requirements that generate TLSR
compliant sub-functions. The Defense Appropriations Act of 1989 designated the first
set of TLSRs for the role of DOD in the war on drugs [Ref. 5:p. 4-3]. The National
Security Strategy for the United States produced each year by the Executive branch has
further delineated the requirements in the following years [Ref. 6:p. 3]. DOD
established the following additional guidelines for controlling the use of the Armed
Forces. These guidelines focus on the responsibility for the detection and monitoring of
aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States:
1
.
Build on existing capabilities and facilities;
2. Employ DOD resources in a way which supports and enhances traditional
mission capability;
3. Limit the modification or procurement of infrastructure and systems which are
dedicated to unique anti-drug activities;
4. Expand upon previous DOD detection efforts;
5. Develop a comprehensive detection and monitoring plan for the borders of the
United States;
16
6. Evaluate existing DOD systems and programs to identify opportunities for
enhancing detection and monitoring capabilities;
7. Coordinate all detection and monitoring activities. [Ref. 2: p. 3]
The command structure for the DOD counterdrug mission was left to the
specified commands, under the guideline of using existing capabilities and facilities.






































Figure 5: Typical Counterdrug Command Structure
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The designated mission assigned to DOD and the structure of the chain of
command frame the constraints that the Counterdrug JTF must operate within. They
directly or indirectly influence the desired outputs of the system-in-focus. The DOD
guidelines listed above establish the top level system requirements of detection,
monitoring and coordination of all federal agency counterdrug C3I efforts. Details of
these specific characteristics are given to demonstrate their required functionality to
accomplish the mission.
a. Detection
The detection of any craft that is known to be or falls within the
established guidelines for suspicion of transporting illicit drugs. These guidelines include
but are not limited to:
1
.
Known previous drug trafficker
2. Off standard sea or air routes
3. Not maintaining typical communications
4. Missing or obscured identification markings
5. Not using proper lighting at night. [Ref. 8: p. 20]
b. Monitoring
Monitoring includes the confirmation of a track as a possible drug
trafficker. The JTF's specific mission is to observe the actions of the craft as it enters
its area of responsibility. A further delineation of the sea is the coastal waters of the
United States, internationally accepted as a 12-mile zone. The maritime commerce area
18
protected by the United States Coast Guard (USCG) extends out to 200 miles from the
coast. Detection and monitoring can occur outside the 200-mile zone depending on the
sensor used. Monitoring then becomes an active function within the 200-mile area.[Ref.
8: p. 22]
c. Coordination for all Federal Agency Counterdrug C3I Efforts
DOD is responsible for becoming the lead agency for the development
of command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) processes and applications
for interagency counterdrug efforts [Ref. 5:p. 3-18].
(1) Hardware and Software Support: As the lead agency for
counterdrug C3I, DOD is responsible for assisting in the development of hardware that
will support the drug war. This is manifested in the supply of leading edge technology
currently in use by DOD to drug law enforcement agencies (DLEAs). An example of
this is Operation Mountain Pass, the overhaul of the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC)
by the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA). Existing hardware, software
(government and civilian off-the-shelf) and continuing support contracts were purchased
by the DOD agency in direct coordination with the Drug Enforcement Administration,
the lead agency for the Intelligence Center. DISA provides guidelines for the purchase
of software and hardware to their geographic counterparts in the DLEAS to ensure
compatibility of systems and to provide the most advanced equipment. JTFs can provide
equipment when tasked for the conduct of an operation. [Ref. 2: p. 2]
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(2) Coordination: The Counterdrug JTF provides direct interface with
equipment and personnel to requesting agencies for DOD support. DLEAs requesting
DOD resources do so through the regional Counterdrug JTF. DOD provides training for
equipment to DLEAs. DOD provides personnel to work with planning and the execution
of command and control activities for interdiction and eradication operations outside the
United States. Advanced communication networks such as the Defense Systems Network
(DSN) provide connectivity for databases and on-line message traffic to federal agencies
on a dedicated network called the anti-drug network or ADNET. 3[Ref. 11]
2. Inputs
Correlated data received from various sources supply the inputs to the
counterdrug JTF at level zero. These sources include but are not limited to HUMINT
resources from federal agencies such as the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA),
Customs, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and foreign diplomatic channels. 4
Communications, electronics and imagery intelligence (COMINT, ELINT, and IMINT)
are supplied from DOD resources directly tasked and operating on counterdrug missions.
[Ref. 9:p. 177]. The variety and quantity of the data received create the requirement for
a specific filtering process that will be examined at a further decomposition level. The
3A comprehensive examination of this top level requirement is beyond the scope of this
thesis. This subject justifies a thesis topic of its own due to the complex arrangement of law,
working procedures and unique requirements each agency has in working in the counterdrug
environment.
4 Any further examination of HUMINT intelligence sources is beyond the classification level of
this thesis. See references 8,9 and 10 for more information.
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data received at the JTF passes through external sensor data processing and is not
received in a raw sensor format. The JTF must conduct operations using existing DOD
resources and cannot become sensor processing facilities. This creates the first time lag
for the JTF in its intelligence analysis process. It also implies that the data have been
subjected to a level of filtering has occurred to the data before its arrival to the JTF.
These two factors will be examined at the third decomposition level.
3. Resources
Resources are the mechanisms available to the JTF to process the inputs and
create outputs that meet the TLSRs. These mechanisms are the personnel, hardware and
software organic to the JTF. Personnel organic to the counterdrug JTF includes
permanently stationed representatives from the DLEAs and other federal agencies. Their
responsibilities are to coordinate intelligence gathering efforts, assist in the consolidation
of intelligence from other agencies, and assist in the processing of the gathered
intelligence. These liaison personnel also assist in the dissemination of the intelligence
product to the appropriate interdiction force. [Ref. 7]
Hardware and software resources are database intensive, and have the ability
to draw upon external databases in near real time to verify and assimilate data to make
a coherent intelligence product. This is assimilation will be described in the Correlation
and Process functions. Resources including personnel and equipment used by the JTF
must derive from previously existing DOD programs and from other federal agencies that

























Figure 6: Level Zero IDEF
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4. Outputs
The outputs of the counterdrug JTF are those products of the functions
designed to meet its top level requirements. At this level of decomposition where the
JTF is at its closest to the environment, the form of this output is specific data on drug
traffickers. They fit either the detection or monitoring criteria defined earlier. This
output can include analytical factors that denote vessel or aircraft type, probable
contraband cargo, and probable port and probable route into U.S. coastal waters. The
data in this form would be assigned to the appropriate agency for interdiction operations.
Currently within U.S. coastal waters U.S. Navy vessels carrying Coast Guard Law
Enforcement Detachments (LEDETs) can board suspicious craft with specific probable
cause and seize the vessel and cargo. 2 This is the only action where the JTF functions
in an operational sense, with control over those forces through its specified command and
in some instances, direct control through an operational control (OPCON) arrangement.
Not all specified commands delegate this authority. Forces Command operates JTF 6
in the southwest border region of the United States as an intelligence processing and
coordination entity with no operational forces assigned for interdiction operations. [Ref.
5:p. 4-16]
2The specific requirements for boarding and seizing cargo and craft, and the LEDET
functioning aboard U.S. Navy ships is examined in detail in reference 10.
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B. SUMMARY
This chapter defined the system-in-focus and its macro level interaction with the
environment. The next chapter will examine the Process function as it relates to the
detection and monitoring system requirements of the Counterdrug JTF. The Detect,
Process and Disseminate functions are macro level elements detailing the level zero
decomposition. The Process function will be decomposed for further detailing of the
system-in-focus. This function maintains the flow of information processing and the
decision making requirements that are the focus of this thesis. The first decomposition
of the system-in-focus defines the environment within which the system operates and
describes the two interactions between the environment and the system-in-focus. The
counterdrug JTF as the system-in-focus interacts by receiving inputs from the
environment. Based on the controls it must operate under and with the available
resources it has, the JTF produces outputs that to meet its mission requirements.
24
C. ACTIVITY REPORT FOR: LEVEL ZERO DECOMPOSITION
[AO] Counterdrug Joint Task Force
Inputs: Processed Aggregate Sensor Input
Outputs: Operational Plans and Intelligence Reports on Identified drug
Trafficking Tracks
Controls: Command Structures, DOD Guideline for Counterdrug Operations
Mechanisms: Resources, Human, Equipment, Information Processing Systems
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m. THE DISAGGREGATION OF LEVEL ZERO: LEVEL ONE
The first specific decomposition of the detection and monitoring top level
requirement develops the IDEFO design relationships to examine their related
decomposed elements. This decomposition illustrates the interaction of the system-in-
focus with the environment. The decomposition will create scenarios that will generate
output from the system-in-focus. The scenario described in the decomposition is the
physical environment and the system structures that are unique to a specific requirement.
The interaction with the environment at the first level of decomposition is the input
to the Detect Sub-function. The interaction at this first sub-function receives processed
data and sends it through both human, hardware and software resources. These
resources then disseminate the processed sensor data as an intelligence product to
interdiction forces in the form of reports and orders.
Level one describes the entire system through the three elements: the Detect sub-
function, the Process sub-function, and the Disseminate sub-function. This first
decomposition level will be the last where the entire flow of data can be seen from input
to output. At subsequent levels of decomposition, the level of detail increases. The
internal functional architecture within a sub-function is hidden from previous levels of
decomposition. This is crucial to tracing requirements facilitation.
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Systems engineering extracts the specific requirements from the goals provided by
higher authority. The first objective is to extract a mission that will accomplish the
system's goals. These missions in the context of systems engineering must be within a
frame of reference and the situational and geographical environment of the specific
system. Systems engineering describes this situational and geographical environment as
the scenario. The scenario description is meant to encompass aspects of the environment
external to the system-in-focus that directly affect the system's desired outputs. The
majority of these catalysts affect the system through controls and inputs. [Ref. 12:p. 15]
A. INTERACTION WITH THE ENVIRONMENT
1. Controls
The controls define the quality and the type of input that the system can
process. The two controls addressed in this thesis at the level zero decomposition are
mission guidance and the command structure. These controls generate specific
requirements and limitations for the inputs. The mission guidance detailed in the level
zero decomposition creates the specific environment within which the requirements must
be accomplished. It also establishes the command structure of the counterdrug JTF.
Examining each guideline the DOD established to meet top level
requirements generated in Chapter I creates a mission-scenario combination that will
generate a sub-function. After an explanation of each specific guideline a table will
provide a summary for each mission-scenario combination.
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The first DOD guideline, building on existing capabilities and facilities, states
that no new ground breaking is authorized either for doctrine or for location. DOD
forces must continue operating in the same locations use established methodologies for
detection, processing and disseminating intelligence products. These methodologies
frame the scenario within which the Counterdrug JTF must operate, and delineate the
requirements of sub-functions related to each decomposed element. Guideline 1
represents the Mission-Scenario combination generated by the existing capabilities
guideline.
Guideline 1
Mission: Build on existing capabilities to conduct counterdrug operation within
DOD capabilities.
Scenario: Under current operational contingencies, plan, coordinate and
conduct counterdrug operations with existing forces and equipment while
continuing wartime readiness training.
Guideline 2 illustrates employing DOD resources in away which supports
and enhances traditional mission capability emphasizes the need to maintain the standards
for war-fighting. Retraining personnel in roles that degrades their performance in the




Mission: Maintain current levels of readiness while executing counterdrug
operations.
Scenario : Conduct counterdrug operations so that they enhance the tasks in
traditional national defense missions.
The modification and procurement of infrastructure and systems that are
dedicated to unique anti-drug activities narrows the scope of the JTFs' mission.
Guideline 3 ensures the development of systems in a counterdrug operation do not detract
from any traditional missions the personnel and equipment are required to perform.
Guideline 3
Mission: Conduct counterdrug operations with current chain of command
relationships.
Scenario: Within the established unified commands, conduct counterdrug
operations under established command structures.
Guideline 4 expands upon previous DOD detection and monitoring efforts
enhances the development of all systems previously involved in counterdrug operations
to be evaluated and used. Implied is the use of systems from traditional national defense
missions to enhance war fighting skills.
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Guideline 4
Mission: Review existing detection and monitoring systems and develop those
that enhance the counterdrug mission.
Scenario : Using assets previously employed in counterdrug operations, promote
their use to enhance all detection and monitoring related DOD missions.
Guideline 5 develops a comprehensive detection and monitoring plan for the
borders of the United States and is a direct mission guideline. This requirement is
restricted by the previous guidelines.
Guideline 5
Mission: Establish a detection and monitoring plan for counterdrug operations
for the border of the United States.
Scenario: Using current capabilities and infrastructure, detect drug trafficking
operations along the border of the United States and disseminate targets to
interdiction forces.
Guideline 6 evaluates existing DOD systems and programs to identify
opportunities for enhancing detection and monitoring capabilities. This focuses on
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enhancing current traditional methodologies and systems through the efforts undertaken
in counterdrug operations.
Guideline 6
Mission : Evaluate current detection and monitoring systems for benefits to the
national defense missions and counterdrug operations.
Scenario; Review all detection and monitoring operations within the regional
command areas and evaluate their benefits for countedrug operations.
The coordination of all detection and monitoring activities places the burden
on DOD to maintain communications networks necessary to ensure connectivity between
DOD and DLEAs. What is implied is a degree of control by DOD resources over other
agencies in the execution of coordinating operations, which does not exist. This
guideline cannot be developed into a mission-scenario combination because of its
dysfunctional premise.
These guidelines have generated mission-scenario combinations that define
the functional requirements of the system-in-focus. These are the specific controls on
the detection and monitoring process.
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2. Inputs
a. Multiple Source Processed Sensor Data.
The Counterdrug JTF receives data at a level of processing that relieves
the JTF of the necessity to have direct sensor data processors and control the operations
of the sensors. The types of data, HUMINT, COMINT, ELINT, and IMINT, as well
as open source information ( newspapers, books, CNN, etc.) are filtered by the agencies
operating with the JTF. These agencies process data which their JTF liaisons assist in
correlating and assessing to determine current operational value. These liaisons and their
relationships will be discussed in detail under resource input to the subsystem. The
cyclic request process for information and the access to DLEA databases is a function
of the liaison as they request data based on ongoing operations.
b. Specific Data Requirement Inputs.
Specific data requirements to access JTF databases and on-line systems
represent specifications necessary for system input. The systems engineer attempts to
identify the layers of detail necessary to develop these specific requirements. The
following sub-functional requirements generate the investigation of each as required
functions and activities that must be accomplished to facilitate their previous level of
decomposition. This ensures that each activity does not overlap into another sub-function
in the system-in-focus.
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c. Key Word Search and Recognition Requirements.
Incoming message traffic from multiple agencies in a multi-level-security
environment generates the need to rapidly distinguish data of importance to the specific
JTF. To start the process of collating related data a key word search and recognition
requirement is required. This requirement begins to identify data that has been
designated by the JTF as related to ongoing operations. A further level of detail is
presented to identify areas of requirements necessary to facilitate decomposition.
(1) Related Sub-requirements:
1. Incoming maximum data traffic capability;
2. Speed of Hardware processing systems;
3. Maximum number of keyword recognition triggers;
4. Multiple Level Secure channels for input and output of information.
(2) Database Requirements
1 . Relational Database and database management system that allows multiple
input and multiple output based on sensitivity of data.
2. Data analysis tools and expert systems that collate related data to a
predetermined level of accuracy based on the operational requirements of
each data package.
d. Imagery Directly Related to Second Sources
The requirement to cross cue incoming imagery with a local database to
verify and update the JTF database with relates to the Correlate and Process sub-
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functions. This requirement combined with the textual data received on the key word
recognition system combine to focus and collate the data into operational and intelligence
data packages.
e. Security and Sanitization for Further Processing
Law enforcement agencies do not have the required facilities to process
special compartmented information (SCI) DOD classification level data received from
DOD intelligence sources. The JTF must protect the source of its intelligence gathering
systems by sanitizing data received from sensitive sources. The DLEAs also consider
their sources of intelligence perishable and must guard against unnecessary exposure to
other agencies not directly related to the specific data package being developed.
/. Communications and Network Requirements
Requirements for a multiple level internal secure network for internal
transmission of data, and for the dissemination of classified material to external agencies
and interdiction forces is generated to facilitate information processing.
(1) Wide Area Network requirements established with DOD through the
Defense Data Network (DDN). The Defense Secure Network (DSNET) 1 operates on
the General Service (GENSER) level for transmitting data at this classification. ADNET
is the specific network in DSNET 1 that the DLEAs use for voice and data traffic for
counterdrug data Ref. 13:p. 27]. The JTF operates at the secret and higher levels of
classification with other DOD agencies for voice and data traffic on DSNET 2 and
DSNET 3[Ref.l 3:p. 17].
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(2) Resource Requirements: The resources act to accomplish the
desired activity internal to the subfunction being decomposed. These resources can be
considered the mechanisms that do the work on the inputs. These mechanisms can be
both equipment and personnel. Together these mechanisms sort data and merge it into
useable information that will assist in ongoing operations. These data packages are
crucial for further operations that require decision making based on analysis of the
inputs. The input requirements arrange the data into cohesive groups of information that
must be matched to present activities and previously collected and processed data.
3. Resources
The automated information processing systems employed by the personnel
that process the data and the liaison personnel are the primary resources of the system.
The detailed decomposition of the tasks of the personnel and the functions of the
equipment is the basis for the third level of decomposition discussed in Chapter V.
4. Outputs
Requirements for processed, analyzed intelligence on a track that can be used
for current operations and disseminated to DLEA for database update and further analysis
represent the output of the process subfunction. Using the networks currently in place
for dissemination, the capacity for exporting information must be to a level capable of
being received by the DLEAs. Transmission of imagery related products is necessary
to accomplish this subfunction requirement.
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A standard format across all agencies transmitting counterdrug data must be
implemented for the transmission of information. This reduces errors from incorrect
information processing and redundant requests for information because of incompatible
or unknown data formats.
Established guidelines for all DOD and DLEAs for timeliness of
dissemination and priority of dissemination based on threat analysis, is key to ensuring
rapid transmission of critical intelligence for interdiction purposes. This is accomplished
by a transmission priority and labeling format that automatically designates and orders
data traffic based on its level of precedence.
Figure 7 illustrates the level one decomposition and its interactions with the
environment. Figure 8 is a detailed decomposition of level one to demonstrate the
interaction of the resources and the generated output of the system. Figure 9 previews
the next level of decomposition and illustrates the relationship between the different
levels.
B. SUMMARY
This chapter establishes mission-scenario combinations that generates requirements
for the sub-functions identified at this level of decomposition. These sub-functions in
turn generate detailed sub-functions that further work to define the system-in-focus. Each
level of decomposition focuses on a specific aspect, rather than trying to show the entire
system and all its related sub-functions. By focusing on one sub-function at each layer
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of decomposition, the specific requirements of detection and monitoring established at
level zero are traced to the lowest level disaggregation. At this simplified level the
engineer starts to build systems that will accomplish each sub-functional requirement.
Because of this simplified level, the interaction of the subfunctions and their inter-
relationships are programmed into the system design, rather than having to be
retroactively installed at a later time.
C. ACTIVITY REPORT FOR: LEVEL ONE DECOMPOSITION
[AO] Counterdrug Joint Task Force
Inputs: Processed Aggregate Sensor Input
Outputs: Operational Plans and Intelligence Reports on Identified drug
Trafficking Tracks
Controls: Command Structures, DOD Guideline for Counterdrug Operations
Mechanisms: Resources, Human, Equipment, Information Processing Systems
[A10] Detect
Inputs: Multiple Processed Sensor and Data Input
Outputs: Established Track Identification
Controls: Specified Command, Top Level Warfare Requirements
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Outputs: Correlated Track Information with Ongoing Interdiction
Operations
Controls: Mission Guidance and Current Operational guidelines
Mechanisms: Information processing systems and Decision Support
Systems resources internal to the Counterdrug JTF
[A12] Disseminate
Inputs: Correlated Track Information with Ongoing Interdiction Operations
Outputs: C3I Information and Action in the form of Intelligence Reports
and Interdiction Orders
Controls: Levels of Security and Ability to Establish Multi-Agency Sensor
Data Report Formats.
Mechanisms: Dedicated Communications Systems to support the reception











Figure 9: Level Two Preview
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IV. SECOND LEVEL DECOMPOSITION:
INTEGRATION OF PROCESSED DATA INTO CURRENT OPERATIONS
Integration of the processed data at this level in the functional architecture
incorporates the human decision making process and the interaction of this process with
a physical environment. The mechanisms internal to the system-in-focus operate in this
environment to accomplish their functional requirements. The previous two levels of
decomposition, level zero and level one, were more abstract in nature due to their wider
scope. Their purpose was to show the context and broad functioning of the Counterdrug
JTF as a system-in-focus and how the JTF interacts with its environment.
The requirement to develop intelligence products and operational orders are the
substantive output of detection and monitoring for the counterdrug JTF. The generation
of this output meets the requirements established in the DOD guidelines to support the
interdiction forces. The Correlate Sub-function is responsible for establishing threads of
continuity from the incoming data. This continuity ensures effective correlation with
other relevant data specific to a targeted vessel, area of concern, specific drug trafficker
or any pre-defined subject of analysis. The resources of this sub-function generate the
requirement for hardware and software that accomplishes the Correlate sub-function.
The Integrate sub-function defines the parameters for the Correlate sub-function by
determining the amount of data that can be integrated into the system. The data leaves
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the Correlate sub-function formatted in such a way that can be manipulated by the
Integrate sub-function to pair it to ongoing operations. The Integrate sub-function also
combines the current database for intelligence gathering missions and to generate a
request for further related data. The output of the Integrate sub-function is
compartmentalized data and the request for further related data. The Assess sub-function
takes this data and establishes its sensitivity to current operations. If the data meets the
established criteria it is time-tagged and forwarded to interdiction forces. This data is
also prioritized based on threat analysis characteristics as it is stored in the database.
These three sub-functions exist within the process function that sends intelligence
products and orders to interdiction forces via the Disseminate function. A key to
understanding functional architectures is to maintain the link with the parent-child
relationship within functions. In IDEFO terminology, the child sub-function retains all
the characteristics of its parent as well as having unique characteristics of its own. These
unique characteristics accomplish specific sub-requirements generated by the parent
function. This design characteristic ensures that no child sub-function operates in an
independent environment, exclusive of its parent. This enhances information hiding and
promotes low levels of functional coupling. Figure 10 shows the IDEFO diagram of the
two sub-functions.
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A. THE CORRELATE SUB-FUNCTION
1. Controls
Addressing the sub-functional requirements to accomplish the Correlate sub-
function demonstrates the level of detail needed in the processing of incoming data to
achieve an output that will support the process of detection and monitoring.
2. Inputs
The sources of data as seen from Figure 5 in Chapter m must be sent in
a format that can be readily absorbed into the decision making process. The correlation
subfunction must be able to associate the incoming data to a dynamic track model or be
associated with a profile to fit into the database at a certain priority level. The controls
for the correlation subfunction are generated by the mission guidance that determine the
ongoing interdiction operations. These mission parameters design the filters for the key
word search and imagery identification systems to screen the information processing
systems. Although specific sensor management is conducted by the sensor's controlling
agency, the JTF requests additional data to build the track model. Once the track
model fits the interdiction criteria it is placed in a queue. The queue constantly feeds the
data association portion of the correlation subfunction, identifying incoming data that will




The incoming message handling capability of the JTF processes the messages
from their baseline format and sends it through data association. The incoming imagery
capability of the JTF is also a function of the data association process. These two
systems within data association merge to build the track's specific drug trafficking
characteristics. Once the model reaches a state that it can be determined to be within the
interdiction criteria, the track is sent into the queue.
4. Outputs
The track queue is the first track management process. The first detailed
examination of track management occurs at this level of decomposition, but is developed
in the level three decomposition of the data fusion sub-function. Internal data flow
requirements establish specific routing of the track model through the physical
environment. The path for textual data and the path for imagery data merge in the
Correlate sub-function. Security requirements for correlating data from different levels
into one intelligence package complicate the data association. Data at the highest level
of security limits its distribution due to restricted transmission requirements. SCI
sanitized to GENSER level for DLEA distribution may omit the source of data, inhibiting
the request for additional related data. To promote direct (and subsequently minimizing)
coupling of functions the mechanisms developing the track model review and generate
additional requests for data based on its position in the queue.
Data sources and requests for data requirements generated by the mechanism












































Figure 10: Level Two Decomposition
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track model. These databases have been established to allow for the exchange of
information within the Counterdrug environment. The El Paso Intelligence Center
(EPIC) has the capability to allow a current operations request to access its national
archives for counterdrug operations. EPIC can also access eight other federal agency
databases for cross referencing of material via on-line file sharing systems. [Ref. 11]
Other ADNET Counterdrug databases are regionally focused, containing
information collected in specific geographic areas under DLEA control. Examples of
these regional databases are the Rocky Mountain Information Network (RMIN), the
Western States Information Network (WSIN), and Operation Alliance, a large DLEA
intelligence and operations effort of the southwest border states. The Regional
Intelligence Sharing System (RISS), consists of seven law enforcement intelligence
programs operating in all fifty states. Six of these programs are specifically focused on
obtaining and distributing criminal intelligence.! Ref. 5:p. 3-5]
B. DATA INTEGRATION
1. Controls
The size (capacity) of the transmission (receive and send) is based upon the
command relationships external to the JTF. The command relationship influences the
ability to request the generation of specific sensor data. Flow of information also is a
function of the command relationships internal and external to the JTF. Internal to the
JTF is the infrastructure of the intelligence fusion cell. The interaction between the



























Figure 11: Level Two Detailed IDEF of Track Priority Sub-function
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of the data fusion cell controls the mechanisms that integrate the track model into the
current interdiction operations.
The ability to visually cross reference both message text and imagery data
simultaneously is a sub-requirement generated from the controls placed upon the Integrate
sub-function. Mission guidance and the chain of command structure create a physical
control on the geographic area of focus. This mission guidance directs operational
planning and the request for sensor data. Generation of unique or additional data
collection is not authorized based on DOD guidance. Access to systems available must
be timely, with an abbreviated chain of command involvement. Request access must be
generated from the intelligence fusion cell and the J2 Intelligence Processing Staff.
2. Input from Correlation
The Prioritize track sub-function takes the track data and reports received in
standardized multi-agency format. The Dynamic Track Model contains all current
information on specific track with the most updated by current sensor data as it returns
from the queue. This data is cross-cued and then set into compartmentalized groupings.
The threat evaluation is accomplished through a pair-wise comparison of the track
model's data with the interdiction criteria. The queue orders and returns data based on
time received, as well as the characteristics of the specific track.
3. Resources
The cross-cuing and threat evaluation of data is accomplished using an expert
system. The purpose of an expert system is to make decisions about a large amount of
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data over a narrow scope of knowledge. [Ref. 14:p. 432] An expert system is an
automated problem solver working in a narrow field of human-based knowledge referred
to as a domain. The expert system must be designed using a human expert in this
narrow field. Techniques for developing the expert system to be used for data
association and threat evaluation can be found in Turban's text, Decision Support and
Expert Systems[Ref.\4]. An expert system pairs incoming data with the established
model framework, decides if it fits the interdiction guidelines, and then prioritizes the
track by its threat status. The key to using an expert system rather than a simple
information processing device is the need to be able to make a value judgement on the
level of threat. This judgement is based on the timeliness, source, and repetition of the
data. Repetition refers to how many times the track characteristic has been reported to
the system from one or more sources. 3
The mechanisms that perform the function of prioritizing the track also initiate the
integration of the specific track into an ongoing interdiction operation. This is the result
of the mission guidance and the pairing of the data to establish a track. This track
changes as it is updated by sensor input.
4. Output
Integration into current operation establish an intelligence and operational
overlay for export to the interdiction forces. These overlays are the output of the
3 A basic discussion of the operation of the expert system involved is needed to define tasks
between the mechanisms that support the specific sub-functional requirement. It is beyond the
scope of this thesis to develop the knowledge acquisition subsystem and knowledge base for a
counterdrug data association expert system.
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Integrate sub-function. Analyze alternatives combines the expert system output with a
human decision maker to begin a decision cycle based on the controls to the sub-function.
Making an assessment, (Assess sub-function) of track bearing on current operations
determines the route of the track. This track is part of an overlay that supports the
current operation.
C. SUMMARY
This chapter describes the level of decomposition that interacts with the human
decision making cycle. The next level of decomposition will describe in greater detail
the decision process involved in physically incorporating the specific track into a current
operational. This overlay will generate a decision cycle in the current operation
concerning analyzing mission alternatives. Figure 12 previews the decomposition of the
Integrate sub-function to demonstrate the internal sub-function of data fusion, the core














Figure 12: Level Three Preview
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D. ACTIVITY REPORT FOR: LEVEL TWO DECOMPOSITION
[All] Process Track with Current Operations
Inputs: Established Track Identification and Current Interdiction Operations
Profile
Outputs: Track Relayed to Interdiction Forces in the Form of an Intelligence
report, or Sent to Intelligence Database
Controls: Mission Guidance Fuzed Intelligence Data
Mechanisms: J2 Staff Intelligence Analyst, Supported by DLEA Liaison input
[A20] Correlate Track with Current Operations
Inputs: Established Track Identification and Current Interdiction
Operations Profile
Outputs: Track Relayed to Interdiction Forces in the Form of an
Intelligence report, or Sent to Intelligence Database
Controls: Mission Guidance Fuzed Intelligence Data
Mechanisms: J2 Staff Intelligence Analyst, Supported by DLEA Liaison
input
[A21] Integrate External Databases for Correlation
Inputs: Correlated Track Information with Ongoing Interdiction Operations
and Intelligence Report for Database
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Outputs: Processed, Correlated and Analyzed Intelligence on Track
delivered to interdiction forces or Stored in Internal JTF Database
Controls: Mission Priority Established By Higher Authority
Mechanisms: Information processing systems and Decision Support
Systems resources internal to the Counterdrug JTF
[A22] Assess Track Characteristics with Current Operations
Inputs: Established Track Identification and Current Interdiction
Operations Profile
Outputs: Track Relayed to Interdiction Forces in the Form of an
Intelligence report, or Sent to Intelligence Database
Controls: Mission Guidance Fuzed Intelligence Data
Mechanisms: Watch Intelligence Officer
Activity Report for: Level Two Detailed Decomposition
[A21] Integrate External Databases for Correlation
Inputs: Correlated Track Information with Ongoing Interdiction
Operations and Intelligence Report for Database
Outputs: Processed, Correlated and Analyzed Intelligence on Track
delivered to interdiction forces or Stored in Internal JTF Database
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Controls: Mission Priority Established By Higher Authority
Mechanisms: Information processing systems and Decision Support
Systems resources internal to the Counterdrug JTF
[A221] Prioritize Track
Inputs: Multiple Sensor Data Correlated to Related Track Established to be
Involved in Current Interdiction Operations
Outputs: Place In Hierarchy for Analysis of Alternatives
Controls: Track Position in Queue and dynamic Track Model Status
Mechanisms: Hardware Resources Internal to the Intelligence Fusion Cell
Based on Established Decision Rules (Interdiction Criteria) for Ordering Track In
Queue
[A222] Analyze Alternatives
Inputs: Position In Intelligence Fusion Cell Hierarchy for Decision Analysis
Outputs: Chosen Course of Action for Track Data (Transmission to Interdiction
Force, Request for Additional data from External Sources, or Database storage)
Controls: Relevancy in Ongoing Mission
Mechanisms: Operations Watch Officer Analysis and Repositioning Based on
Decision Making Process Using Expert System and Decision Support Systems
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V. THIRD LEVEL DECOMPOSITION: DATA FUSION
This chapter completes the design of the functional architecture of the Counterdrug
JTF Detection and Monitoring mission by describing the data fusion process. This
process is described by Waltz and Buede as :
The core function of data fusion is the process of combining collected sensor data
on a single target to infer its identity and even higher attributes (e.g., intent, future
behavior, and threat capability). [Ref 15: p. 403]
The fusion of the data in the decision support cycle captures the specific tasks of the data
fusion cell. The interaction between man and machine defines the tasks necessary for
both to meet the TLSRs. This interaction also delineates specific requirements
accomplished in an Expert System and Decision Support environment.
The decomposition of the data fusion function initiates with a description of the
track control process and the track management sub-function (See Figure 13). The data
fusion process will be decomposed by demonstrating the subsystems inherent to the
process. The command and control sub-system, the production work flow sub-system,
and the maintenance sub-system each perform specific task to process the track (See
Appendix B). These sub-systems are integral to the data fusion process and must
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Figure 13: Level Three Decomposition
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By distinguishing the three sub-systems the systems engineer demonstrates inter-
relationships of the system and how they work together to accomplish the specified tasks
of the system.
A. CONTROLS
The fusion of the track takes place based on its relative position in the queue. This
position is a function of its threat level derived from the data association activity of the
Correlation sub-function. The interdiction criteria and guidance from higher is
imperative to restate because it is a variable that directly effects the unique track's
position in the queue. Specific mission parameters generate requests to supply
interdiction forces with timely information. A degradation of timeliness will occur based
on the processing of the sensor data by the sensor's host. A standard from DOD
guidelines established to define the priority of incoming sensor data will allow a time-
tagging system to prioritize incoming data traffic.
B. INPUTS TO DATA FUSION
The automated track management system is the mechanism for processing the track
identification with the internal database. This mechanism provides the input to the data
fusion process. The track control and processing system monitors the cyclic decision
process to incorporate new information from the Correlation sub-function. The data
fusion process receives updated track information associated with the track.
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C. RESOURCES: THE USE OF AN EXPERT SYSTEM
1. The Amount of Information
The amount of information available and ability to process it remains a
difficult task at all levels of decision making. Within the Counterdrug JTF the process
is complicated by the technologies that allow for more data to be brought into the JTF
that can be processed efficiently by personnel. The nature of the information, coming
from different sources and having no specific triggers that separate more important data
from routine are two more factors that lead to the use of an expert system. A brief
discussion of expert systems (ES) and decision support systems (DSS) and their functions
within the data fusion process is necessary. A complete examination of the definitions,
requirements and building of specific ES and DSS can be found in references eight and
nine. An ES replaces human judgement in a narrow domain of information by using a
well-defined and thoroughly established knowledge base. This knowledge base generates
the decisions in lieu of human judgement. This ES does not simply forward messages
based on certain words or phrases in received text. It has the ability to assess the value
of the information, weigh it against pre-established criteria in its knowledge base, and
come to a conclusion about the data. This conclusion leads to the decision. The ES also
retains the ability to explain the reasons for its conclusions about the data. This function
of the ES allows human decision makers to review and revise the ES as necessary. Non-
expert personnel working in the data fusion cell can learn from the ES by examining this
reason function.
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2. What an ES Cannot Do
The shortfalls of the ES are based on the expertise and knowledge transfer
to the machine within the narrow domain. The narrow domain for the counterdrug JTF
for data fusion would be international laws and treaties between the United States and
other countries concerning laws of interdiction. The domain would also include specific
interdiction guidelines used by federal agencies. The knowledge domain will also include
the DOD guidelines for detection and monitoring operations. These requirements in the
knowledge base would not be to decide on interdiction, but to insure the incoming data
meets all the requirements for that decision to be made. This level of decomposition
focuses on the fusion of incoming data from multiple sources into a useable intelligence
product that can be disseminated to interdiction forces. This information once collated
into a useable product will be the basis for the chain of command and the operations
personnel to make the decision. [Ref. 14:pp. 437-441]
3. The Use of a Decision Support System
The difference between a Decision Support System (DSS) and an ES is the
DSS provides the decision maker alternative courses of action given the parameters it was
established to interpret. The ES makes decisions based on a narrowly defined knowledge
base while the DSS is designed to assist the decision maker by simplifying or reducing
procedures to make decisions. The DSS performs as a tool to streamline the decision
making process. Andrew P. Sage describes a DSS as:
...a system that supports technological and managerial decision making by
assisting in the organization of knowledge about ill-structured, semi- structured or
unstructured issues [Ref. 16:p. 1].
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A structured problem is one regularly occurring,or has a well-defined framework for
solving based on previous information. The environment the Counterdrug JTF operates
within facilitates the use of a DSS.
The primary components of a DSS are the database management system
(DBMS), the model base management system (MBMS) and the dialog generation and
management system (DGMS). The DBMS primarily controls all manipulations on the
database, insuring that any action does not disrupt or change any data. It manages large
quantities of data in physical storage and works to reduce physical redundancy within the
database. The MBMS functions to transform the data from the DBMS into information
that is useful for decision making [Ref. 14:p. 81]. The DGMS is the facilitator between
system user and the MBMS. Its purpose is to provide physical sensory interface to the
user of the data processed [Ref. 14:P. 131]. This interface can occur in a variety of
ways commonly termed interaction language. The focus for this thesis will be the
graphical and textual display between the system user (the data fusion cell watch
personnel) and the DSS. This system must provide the user with a graphical display of
a geographic area of responsibility unique to the specific JTF, the track identification
number, and the ability to access the track history. This track history in the database can
be used to develop courses of action in the DSS to establish possible future behavior and
intent of the track4 .
4 The complete development of ES and DSS requirements to facilitate the data fusion process








































Figure 14: Data Fusion Sub-System Operations
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D. OUTPUTS
The output of the data fusion process is the product of the Intelligence watch
officer, the operations watch officer and the systems they use. These outputs are
summarized in Table VII. This matrix describes the tasks to be performed along the
horizontal axis and the personnel or equipment that performs it along the vertical axis.
E. DATA FUSION SUB-SYSTEM OPERATIONS.
At this level of decomposition an analysis of the interaction of the systems within
the Data Fusion function demonstrates the necessary coupling of systems to accomplish
the functional requirements. Command and Control, Production-Work Flow and
Maintenance Sub-systems all work internally to the function to accomplish its
requirements. Figure 14 demonstrates the interaction of these sub-systems within the
Data Fusion Function. The Activity Report generated by the IDEFO design defines in
detail the inputs, outputs, controls and mechanisms acting on each system.
1. The Command and Control Sub-System
Figure 15 illustrates the command and control (C2) sub-system within the data
fusion function. The purpose of the C2 sub-system is to provide direction and guidance
to the production work flow sub system and the maintenance sub-system. This direction
and guidance is framed by the controls on the function. The direction and guidance
applies to actions within the system. Examples would be to direct the production-work
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Figure 15:Command and Control Sub-System
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The C 2 sub-system receives sub-system status and information from the other sub-
systems and monitors changes in the environment that would effect the system.
a. The C2 sub-system senses the change from the information received as
inputs from the sub-systems.
b. The C2 sub-system processes this change framed by its controls, using
the mechanisms of the data fusion cell.
c. The C2 sub-system decides on how it will redirect the production work
flow and updates its data base with this information.
2. The Production Work-Flow Sub-System
Figure 16 illustrates the interactions of the production work flow sub-system.
In the data fusion function, it is the production work flow sub-system that acts on the
collected sensor data. Using the resources organic to the function, the production work
flow increases or decreases its activity level to accomplish its system requirements.
a. The production work flow sub-system senses the change by receiving
the track data from the queue andframing it in terms of the C2 sub-systems direction
and guidance.
b. The production work flow sub-system processes the track data using the
knowledge base of the expert system, updates the data, confirms the interdiction criteria
or changes the priority of the track based on this new sensor data.
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c. The production work flow sub-system decides if the change to the
priority facilities a change in the tracks status in the queue. This decision is passed
to the DSS that updates the graphical display to the user.
The data fusion cell performs all these functions nearly simultaneously. The tasks
of the personnel and equipment requiring a high level of synchronization and
coordination. Synchronization of functions and the coordination of the entails a complete
development of hardware and software requirements. The focus of this thesis is to
demonstrate these detailed requirements and any examination of these requirements would
be beyond the scope of this thesis.
3. The Maintenance Sub-System
The purpose of the maintenance sub-system is to monitor the physical aspects
of the system and provide a sub-system status report to the Command and Control sub-
system. The expert system, in processing the data in production work flow monitors
these mechanisms and determines the system's responsiveness to ongoing operations.
The maintenance sub-system only reports on those physical attributes of the system and
does not process any external data.
The design of the data fusion process demonstrating its internal functions
completes the functional decomposition of the detection and monitoring requirements of
the Counterdrug JTF. David Marca in his text SADT, Structural Analysis and Design
Technique, states the following six criteria for stopping a structural decomposition [Ref.
12: p. 112]
66
a. The process contains sufficient detail.
b. A change in abstraction level is required to continue.
c. A change in viewpoint is required to continue.
d. The process is very similar to a process in another level of
decomposition.
e. The process is very similar to a process in the same level of
decomposition.
f. The process is a trivial function.
The model is completed at this point because any further decomposition of
the JTF would have to use a different view point or level of abstraction. The viewpoint
of the system engineer detailing the purpose of the Counterdrug JTF by decomposing the
functional requirement of the Detection and Monitoring TLSR would have to change in
scope to a technical requirements view. The purpose of this thesis was to decompose the
detection and monitoring process of the JTF to assist in establishing a functional
architecture based on the sub-functional requirements generated by the decomposition.
Any further decomposition would start to incorporate physical technical requirements for
the environment, hardware and software associated with the detection and monitoring
process. The scope of this thesis was to demonstrate the framework for the functional
architecture and stimulate the decomposition from other viewpoints, such as the
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68
F. SUMMARY
When it is apparent that any further decomposition will require a discussion of how
the process physically accomplishes its functions, then a different level of abstraction is
needed [Ref. ll:p. 113]. The discussion of the use of specific types of ES or DSS to
facilitate sub-functional operations and their development would breach the current
abstraction level.
This level of decomposition is not sufficient to design a complete functional
architecture for the Counterdrug JTF. Its purpose has been to establish the framework
for the continuing examination of each level of the functional architecture and initiate the
examination of possible alternative functional architectures that would accomplish the top-
level system-requirements. These alternative architectures may depart from the candidate
architecture at any level of decomposition. This departure must still accomplish the sub-
functional requirements of any parent functions associated with the design. The
conclusion of this thesis will propose an alternative architecture based on an examination
of the original guidelines established to define the detection and monitoring mission for
DOD.
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G. ACTIVITY REPORT FOR: LEVEL THREE DECOMPOSITION
[A21] Integrate Track Data
Inputs: Correlated Track Information with Ongoing Interdiction Operations and
Intelligence Report for Database
Outputs: Processed, Correlated and Analyzed Intelligence on Track delivered to
interdiction forces or Stored in Internal JTF Database
Controls: Mission Priority Established By Higher Authority
Mechanisms: Information processing systems and Decision Support Systems
resources internal to the Counterdrug JTF
[A30] Track Control and Processing
Inputs: Position of Track in Queue,
Outputs:Track Paired with Current Mission, Updated Position of Track in
Queue, Time-tagged for Sensitivity
Controls: Interdiction Criteria from Higher, Current
Interdiction Mission
Mechanisms: Automated Track Management Systems and Databases
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[A31] Data Fusion of Track
Inputs: Track Paired with Current Mission, Updated Position of Track in
Queue, Time-tagged for Sensitivity
Outputs: Intel Product for use by Intelligence Personnel in External
Agencies and Interdiction Operational Orders
Controls: Current Interdiction Mission
Mechanisms: Data Fusion Cell Watch Officers ES and DSS Resources
[A32] Database Update
Inputs: Intel Product for use by Intelligence Personnel in External
Agencies that have access to Database that maintains track Queue
Outputs: Track Paired with Current Mission, Updated Position of Track
in Queue, Time-tagged for Sensitivity,
Controls: Current Interdiction Mission
Mechanisms: Database Management System and Communication
Networks
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Activity Report for: Detailed Level Three Decomposition
[A31] Data Fusion of Track
Inputs: Track Paired with Current Mission, Updated Position of Track in
Queue, Time-tagged for Sensitivity
Outputs: Intel Product for use by Intelligence Personnel in External Agencies
and Interdiction Operational Orders
Controls: Current Interdiction Mission
Mechanisms: Data Fusion Cell Watch Officers ES and DSS Resources
[A410] Command and Control Sub-System
Inputs: Sub-System Status Info Ability to process track data from
Production Work Flow and Maintenance Sub-systems
Outputs: Information and Direction, Higher Guidance Directed Interdiction
Criteria for Track Data Maintenance Update
Controls: Data Fusion Cell Watch Officer Direction, Higher
Authority
Mechanisms: Decision Support System Operated by Data Fusion Cell
Watch Personnel
[A411] Production Work-flow Sub-System
Inputs: Updated Track Data from Queue,
Outputs: Intelligence Products to Interdiction Forces and Operational Plans
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Controls: Infomiation and Direction from the C2 Sub-System, Focuses
Decision- Making Cycle in Production Work Flow on Current Operations Generated
from Higher Guidance
Mechanisms: Expert System Used in Conjunction with Watch Personnel
To Produce Track Threat Priority and Create Intelligence Product Maintenance Sub-
System
Inputs: Rate of Operation and Status of Equipment and Personnel
Operating Automated Systems
Outputs: Sub-System Status of Production Work-Flow, Ability of System
to Meet System Requirements to Fulfill mission parameters
Controls: Information and Direction from the C2 Sub-System
Mechanisms: Human and Automated Maintenance Resources
[A412] Maintenance Sub-System
Inputs: Rate of Operation and status of equipment and personnel operating
systems
Outputs Sub-system status of Production Work Flow, Ability of System
to meet system requirements to meet and fulfill mission parameters
Controls: Information and Direction from the C2 sub-system
Mechanisms: Human and Automated Maintenance resources
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Activity Report for: Command and Control Sub-System Decomposition
[A410] C2 Sub-System
Inputs: Sub-system Status and Information Received from Production Work-
Flow and Maintenance Sub-System
Outputs: Information and Direction, Decision Criteria for Production Work-
Flow
Controls: Data Fusion Cell Watch Officer Direction, Higher
Authority
Mechanisms: Decision Support System, DLEA Liaison in Data Fusion Cell
[A4110] Sense
Inputs: Sub-system Status and Information Received from Process and
Decide sub-systems
Outputs: Identification of Track Model Variable Change that requires
system to increase, decrease or change current operating variables
Controls: Current Interdiction Operational Plan Directed from Higher
Authority as seen by Watch
Mechanisms: Specified Tasks for Data Fusion Cell Watch, Personnel and
Automated Information Processing Systems
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[A4120] Process
Inputs: Identification of Track Model Variable Change that requires
Updating from the Sense sub-system
Outputs: Matching Data from Sense to Track Model in Queue to adapt
system to respond to variable changes
Controls: Time for Decision Cycle, Current Interdiction Operational
Plan Directed from Higher Authority as seen by Watch
Mechanisms: Expert System that Compares Data while Matching to
Specified Tasks for Data Fusion Cell Watch
Personnel and Automated Information Processing Systems
[A4130] Decide
Inputs:Matching Data from Sense to Track Model in Queue to adapt
system to respond to variable changes received from Process function
Outputs: Information and Direction for system adaptation to variable
change to Sense sub-system
Controls: Time for Decision Cycle, Current Interdiction Operational
Plan Directed from Higher Authority as seen by Watch
Mechanisms: Specified Tasks for Data Fusion Cell Watch Personnel and
Automated Information Processing Systems
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Activity Report for: Production Work-Flow Sub-System Decomposition
[A411] Production Work-Flow Sub-System
Inputs: Track Data from Queue
Outputs: Interdiction Intel Report or Operational Plans, Sub-System Status
Report on Ability to Produce Functional Requirements
Controls: Information and Direction from C2 Sub-System
Mechanisms: Expert System Used by Operations Watch Personnel
[A4210] Sense
Inputs: Track Data from Queue
Outputs: Verified Sensor Data Associated to Track
Controls: Information and Direction from C2 Sub-system
Mechanisms: Expert System Knowledge Base and Tasks of the
Operations Watch Officer
[A4220] Process
Inputs: Verified Sensor Data Associated to Track
Outputs: Grouped Data Information that Fits Criteria from mission
guidance and is Paired to Ongoing Operations,
Controls: Information and Direction from C2 Subsystem
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Mechanisms: Expert System Knowledge Base and Tasks of the Opns
Watch Officer
[A4230] Decide
Inputs: Grouped Data Information that Fits Criteria from mission guidance
and is Paired to Ongoing Operations
Outputs: Decision to update Track data in Queue and send Grouped data
to Interdiction Forces or to Store on Internal Database, Interdiction Intel Report or
Operational Plans
Controls: Information and Direction from C2 Subsystem, Time in
Decision Cycle
Mechanisms: Expert System Knowledge Base and Tasks of the Opns
Watch Officer
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VI. AN ALTERNATIVE CANDIDATE ARCHITECTURE
A. THE COUNTERDRUG DATA FLOW AND DECISION CYCLE
This thesis began with a description of the environment that the counterdrug JTF
operations within. It then decomposes the mission requirements that had been established
for the Department of Defense by the National Command Authority. This process from
environment to third decomposition level is illustrated in Figure 18 .
The path from the drug trafficking environment through the external agency sensor
systems to the Watch Officers that create the intelligence reports begins to demonstrate
the complexity of creating a functional architecture for the system-in -focus. One
significant point that is demonstrated in this thesis is the incorporation of operational
directives (planning interdiction missions) and the participation ofDOD agencies in actual
interdiction operations. The specific guidelines in chapter n do not address these
operations. They are derived from the mission scenario combinations to maintain the
force's combat readiness and utilize personnel and equipment for detection and
monitoring operations that enhance war fighting skills. The development of these actions
that the DOD agencies participate in can be the point of departure for an alternative
candidate architecture. The Alternative Candidate Command Structure is developed from
the same decomposition path discussed in Chapter I. The point of departure from the
candidate architecture developed in the previous chapters evolves from the current JTF




































Figure 17: Data Fusion and Decision Support System Integration
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the current operations that include the planning and execution of interdiction operations
in the J3 and J5 staff of the JTFs. The change in architecture would be with the current
operational planning for interdiction operations. This function would become an external
function to be executed by personnel on the staffs of the agencies that conduct the actual
interdiction operations. The primary agency responsible interdiction of maritime drug
smuggling targets is the United States Coast Guard (USCG). An alternative architecture
would be to have the planning for interdiction operations conducted by USCG personnel
external to the JTF. The JTF Data Fusion Cell would be unchanged in function. The
focus of the JTF would solely be an intelligence product to be used by the USCG
planners. Currently the JTFs are commanded and staffed with USCG personnel. But
the Counterdrug JTF have few or no organic assets to employ for immediate interdiction
operations. The USN and USCG ships are tasked to support the JTFs for interdiction
operations. These ships are under the operational control of the JTF for specific
operations then return to their home stations[Ref.7]. This violates the military principles
of unity of command and economy of force. The JTFs can only plan operations based
around these assets, rather than based on the indications and warnings presented by the
current threat. Economy of force is violated because one geographical region may have
Navy, Coast Guard and Customs conducting similar interdiction operations with no unity
of effort. The Coast Guard is the only federal agency that has a peacetime law
enforcement mission and a wartime responsibility under the Department of Defense.
The operational planning function already has an existing structure to fall within. The
Maritime Defense Zones (MARDEZ) were established in 1984 by a joint Navy and Coast
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Guard board to establish war time tasking for the USCG. The mission of the MARDEZ
is to:
. . .conduct coordinate and control operations in the area designated as the Marine
Defense Zone, as required, in order to ensure the integrated defense of the area,
to protect coastal sea lines of communication, and to establish and maintain
necessary control of the vital coastal sea areas, including ports, harbors, navigable
waters, and offshore assets of the United states, exercising both statutory and naval
command capability. [Ref. 9: p. 196]
The key difference would be the functioning of the Counterdrug JTFs and their
output. By producing intelligence reports and maintaining their cyclic data fusion
functioning, the JTFs would completely fulfill their top level system requirement, to
disseminate the detection and monitoring of suspected drug traffickers to the appropriate
interdiction agency. Figure 18 indicates the possible structure in the Counterdrug
environment adapted from its current role as seen in Figure 17.
The personnel and functions matrix presented in the presented in the previous
chapter is not significantly altered changing tasks of personnel and equipment. The J3
and J5 functions internal to the JTF remain to plan and coordinate the actions of the
Counterdrug JTF. These two staff functions would no longer be required to plan,
coordinate, request the resources and then execute interdiction operations with forces
external to their command. The data fusion product from the JTF would be the J2
functioning of the MARDEZ in the execution of their interdiction operations.
The purpose of an alternative architecture is to provide the decision maker a
different perspective to solving the specific mission the candidate architecture has been
designed to accomplish. Alternative architectures do not have to be great departures
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from the original candidate. Alternatives should be developed in parallel and then
presented to the decision maker. Alternative architectures must accomplish the system
requirements of the system, or they cannot be considered a viable candidate. Deciding
on the architecture to develop becomes a function of buildability. Buildability is the step
in systems engineering that determines if the architecture designed is feasible to construct
based on such factors as cost, resource availability, technology limitations and physical
environment constraints. The system engineer examines these factors only after
constructing the candidate architectures.
B. SUMMARY
The purpose of this chapter was to examine a viable alternative to the functional
architecture developed in the previous chapters. The alternative has no functional
deviations in the decomposition of the detection and monitoring processes and their TLSR
compliant sub-functions. Its difference is in the planning, coordination and execution of


































Figure 18: Alternative Architecture Output
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vn. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this thesis was to develop a candidate functional architecture for the
Counterdrug JTF Detection and Monitoring process using a systems engineering
approach. This thesis introduces the environment of the counterdrug JTF, discusses the
controls that effect the ability of the JTF to produce TLSR compliant outputs and the
resources of the JTF that process the input and make it into a viable product. This was
done by a process of decomposing a function to reduce its complexity. Each level was
decomposed and using the principle of information hiding, a further level of detail was
exposed. The disaggregation continued until the basic core functioning of data fusion
was explored. The sub-systems that are integral to the functioning of data fusion allow
an inspection of the requirements necessary to control the sub-function, monitor its
performance, and maintain its productivity.
This thesis did not attempt to delineate all the requirements necessary to construct
a counterdrug JTF. Its purpose was to provide a tool to examining current operations
and procedures in a JTF to verify and confirm their compliance to their mission
objectives. This thesis also provides a departure from the design with an alternative
candidate architecture derived from the original baseline guidance that generated the
creation of the Counterdrug JTFs.
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The Joint Task Force that must interpret multiple agency data input must be able
to conduct situation assessment concerning the data as it arrives for processing. This
assessment occurs at many levels within the architecture. The decomposing of the
function ensures that no unintentional redundancy or procedural gap that could occur
during the information processing.
A. AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY
1. Physical Requirements Determination for a Counterdrug JTF
The actual physical requirements necessary to facilitate the core data fusion
process were beyond the scope of this thesis. The breadth level examination of this
thesis demonstrates the need to conduct a systematic decomposition of the physical
correlation of data. The data association and correlation sub-functions hardware and
software requirements and the interoperability with external sensor inputs should be the
subject of further study.
2. Interoperability Requirements Determination for Multi-Agency Sensor
Fusion.
The ability for agencies to transmit data via multiple secure routes with the
ability to discriminate receivers of the information on a network is a key area for further
research. Current stovepipes exist that limit the ability of agencies to transfer data across
the current ADNET system. One major shortfall is the inconsistency across federal
agencies for the standardization of classification levels. Now that DOD is the lead
agency for development of C3I issues in the war on drugs, this issue should be the
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domain of the DOD to remedy. The issue would then be the ability to have other federal
agencies equipped to handle current DOD security levels.
B. RECOMMENDATION
The use of a systems engineering approach in establishing a multiple agency task
force provides the benefits of giving a template for the design of the functional
architecture. This functional architecture design using a breadth first examination details
specific areas for further detailed decomposition. This process is recommended at the
beginning of the formation for a Task Force. While previous task force creation has
been ad hoc based on the temporary nature of task forces, the permanence of these
organizations and the continuing development of JTFs across the spectrum of federal
agencies requires the use of systems engineering.
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APPENDIX A SYSTEMS ENGINEERING AND DESIGN/BDEF®
A. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING
Two definitions of systems engineering and the methodology of functional
architecture are presented to illustrate the focus of the systems used in the presentation
of developing a candidate architecture for a counterdrug joint task force. The first is
from the published military standard on systems engineering, as of the sixth of May,
1992, replacing the previous edition published in 1974. MIL-STD-499B defines systems
engineering as:
An interdisciplinary approach to evolve and verify an integrated and life-cycle
balanced set of system product and process solutions that satisfy customer needs.
Systems Engineering: (a) encompasses the scientific and engineering efforts related
to the development, manufacturing, verification, deployment, operations, support,
and disposal of the system products and processes, (b) develops needed user
training equipments, procedures, and data (c) establishes and maintains
configuration management of the system, (d) develops work breakdown structures
and statements of work, and (e) provides information for management decision
making. [Ref. 17:p. 5]
In his book Decision Support Systems Engineering, Andrew P. Sage describes
systems engineering as:
...a focus on the tools and methods that support the application of the principals of
the physical and material sciences for the betterment of humankind, . . . that
enable design for more efficient and effective human interaction. [Ref. 16:p. 10 ]
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Sage further describes systems design engineering as the methodology of
decomposing large design issues into smaller component subsystems, and build the
complete system as a collection of these then-integrated subsystems. This thesis attempts
to use these principles in the design of a candidate architecture for a counterdrug joint
task force.
Functional architecture is a methodology associated with systems engineering.
Functional Architectures are descriptions of the detailed processes or functions that must
occur if the desired systematic performance is to be obtained and the locational and
environmental constraints are to be satisfied[Ref. 3:p. 6]. The process is developed to
ensure the engineer can physically design hardware and software without constant
reliance and consultation with the designers of the system. The engineer works with the
most detailed function in a functional architecture to ensure there are no unforeseen
redundancies or incompatible systems. The intent is to reduce the likelihood of
misinterpretation of the systems and the processes that make them function so that no
retroactive work must be done.
B. DESIGN/IDEF®
Design/IDEF® is a software application used to graphically demonstrate the
reduction of the major system into its subsystems, and illustrate the relationships and
connectivity between different subsystems and between different levels. Developed by
Meta Software Corporation in Boston, Massachusetts, this software is a diagramming tool
and data dictionary designed to decompose a problem graphically. IDEF stands for
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ICAM (Integrated Computer Assisted Manufacturing) and IDEFO is similar to SADT,
Structured Analysis and Design Technique developed by Softech Corporation in the
1970s. SADT and IDEFO have become a common tool for requirements definition by
military and industry. [Ref. 12:p. xv] This taking apart of a system represented by boxes
and arrows, allows each piece to be analyzed on its own. Arrows in IDEF represent
information or data necessary to carry out the activities of the system and the information
and information or products produced by the activity to accomplish the overall purpose
of the system. The system is acted upon by inputs from the environment and controls
from higher authority. Resources organic to the system perform the functions necessary
to produce the output of the system. This output must conform to the specific









Figure 19: SADT Process Box
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Using a top down approach, each IDEF diagram goes from the more general to the
specific, from a single diagram that represents a whole system to a detailed diagram that
explains how a specific subfunction works and relates to the other sub-functions. [Ref.
18: p. 4]
IDEFO creates a controlled and structured environment to examine a complex
system one piece at time. The meaning for each piece of the system is grasped without
having to be exposed to the entire system at once. This is done in an effort to increase
the engineer's understanding of each specific requirement in the design, and to
understand the cohesion necessary from one subfunction to the next. The decomposition
of the total system and then the development of the coupling between sub-system reduces
inefficient redundancies or incompatibilities during construction of the system.
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